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ALD-087       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4214 
___________ 
 
GINA LEVIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN LILLIEN, DDS; ESSEX ORAL SURGERY GROUP, P.A. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil No. 12-cv-00140) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 17, 2013 
Before:  SLOVITER, VANSASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 25, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Gina Levin, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey dismissing her complaint for lack of subject matter 
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jurisdiction.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 Levin filed a complaint against Dr. Steven Lillien and the Essex Oral Surgery 
Group (the “defendants”) asserting claims of negligence and false imprisonment arising 
out of a dental procedure during which Dr. Lillien allegedly injured Levin and ignored 
her requests to stop the dental work he was performing.  Levin averred that the District 
Court had federal question jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Public 
Health and Welfare Act, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996.   
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  In response, Levin 
sought leave to amend her complaint so that she could pursue claims of battery, fraud, 
and “patient abandonment” instead of her previously-asserted claims.  Levin stated that 
she no longer wished to rely on the federal statutes named in her original complaint as the 
basis for the court’s jurisdiction.  Instead, Levin sought to add as a co-defendant Aetna 
Insurance Company, an entity she claimed was vicariously liable for her harm, and 
invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction.  Levin also asked the District Court to transfer 
her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the extent she had filed it in the wrong 
court.  While these motions were pending, Levin filed a complaint in New Jersey state 
court raising the claims she sought to raise in her amended complaint and acknowledging 
that she had erroneously filed a complaint in federal court.   
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 The Magistrate Judge denied Levin’s motion to amend her complaint, concluding 
that amendment would be futile because both Levin and Dr. Lillien are New Jersey 
citizens, and thus, even if Aetna was added as a defendant, complete diversity would be 
lacking.  The Magistrate Judge also noted that Levin had abandoned her federal claims 
and federal question jurisdiction did not exist.   
 The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the District Court deny Levin’s 
motion to remand or transfer the matter to state court.  The Magistrate Judge explained 
that a remand was not available because Levin’s complaint was originally filed in federal 
court and that a transfer was not available under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 because that statute 
only applies to transfers within the federal system.  Finally, the Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the District Court grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss Levin’s 
original complaint because she no longer wished to assert a federal claim, diversity 
jurisdiction was lacking, and New Jersey state court was the proper forum for her claims.  
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and this 
appeal followed. 
 Levin contends in her submission to this Court that the District Court erred in 
dismissing her complaint with prejudice because such a dismissal may affect her state 
court complaint.  We agree with Levin that the dismissal of her complaint should have 
been without prejudice to the pursuit of her claims in state court.  See South Austin Coal. 
Cmty. Council v. SBC Commc’ns Inc., 191 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 1999) (“every 
jurisdictional dismissal is without prejudice to litigation of the merits in some other court 
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or at some other time”).  However, although the District Court’s order provides for a 
dismissal with prejudice, there is no question in this case that, as a matter of law, the 
District Court’s decision has no preclusive effect, other than on the merits of its 
jurisdictional ruling.  Disher v. Info. Res., Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989).  The 
Magistrate Judge’s report addresses solely the question of subject matter jurisdiction and 
contemplates that Levin’s claims will be adjudicated on the merits in state court.  The 
District Court’s dismissal with prejudice reflects only that Levin’s federal action has 
ended.  Thus, no relief is due.    
 To the extent Levin appeals the denial of the motion to amend her complaint, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Levin’s motion.  See Shane v. 
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting in context of Rule 12(b)(6) motion that 
leave to amend is properly denied where amendment would be futile);  Zambelli 
Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring complete 
diversity of citizenship for federal jurisdiction).  The District Court also did not err in 
denying Levin’s motion to remand or transfer her complaint to state court.  McLaughlin 
v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 1983).  Finally, for the reasons stated 
in the Magistrate Judge’s report, the District Court properly granted defendants’ motion 
to dismiss Levin’s original complaint.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
